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TRUST ADMINISTRATION -APPORTIONMENT AND OTHER REM-

EDIES OF AN INCOME BENEFICIARY WHEN THE TRUSTEE'S RETENTION OF UNPRODUCTIVE PROPERTY CAUSES A Loss OR TERMINATION OF INCOME - When a trust is created for successive beneficiaries, the life tenant and remainderman each have interests in
the trust estate. The former has the right to income1 and to prevent the improper reduction of corpus during his life; 2 the latter
is entitled to the corpus on the death of the former. During the
time that any of the trust assets fail to yield an income, a life cestui
is deprived of his interest in that trust. The purpose of this comment is to examine apportionment and other remedies of a beneficiary who has been deprived of his income by the retention of
unproductive property,8 and especially to examine the problems
which arise when the trustee's retention of such assets constitutes
a breach of trust.

I.

REMEDIES AGAINST THE TRUSTEE

Courts will frequently permit a trustee temporarily to retain
unproductive property which cannot be immediately sold at a fair
price. Such a retention may be permitted either when the settlor

1 It has even been held that the life tenant has the sole right to complain where the
trustee either retained an unproductive asset, St. Louis Trust Co. v. Ohio, 240 Mo. App.
1033, 222 S.W. (2d) 556 (1949), or charged improper expenses against income, Estate of
Walsh, 32 N.J. Super. 528, 108 A. (2d) 652 (1954).
2 A reduction of corpus would in turn bring about a reduction of income. For a discussion of the rights of various beneficiaries to complain of injury to corpus and income, see
9 A.L.R. (2d) 10 (1950). See also 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §216.2 (1956), and note 3 to
that section.
3 Section 11 of the Uniform Principal and Income Act defines unproductive property
as "realty or personalty which for more than a year and until disposed of as hereinafter
stated has not produced an average net income of at least one per centum per annum of
its fair inventory value or in default thereof its market value at the time the principal
was established or of its cost where purchased later. . • ." TRUSTS REsTATEMENT SECOND
§231 (1956) defines unproductive property as property "which produces no income or an
income substantially less than the current rate of return on trust investments...."
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originally entrusted the property to the fiduciary in its unproductive state4 or when the trustee acquires property which later ceases
to produce income.5 Under such circumstances, the trustee is not
responsible for the resulting loss of income. 6 On the other hand,
if the trustee violated his fiduciary duty in acquiring or retaining
such property, then the life tenant has a cause of action against
the trustee for damages, 7 usually measured by the rate of return
on trust investments.8 Under certain circumstances9 the damages
will be computed at the maximum legal rate of interest, or compound interest.10
Also, where there has been an improper retention of unproductive property, the life beneficiary usually has the power to
compel a sale of the property,11 to charge the trustee with the loss
brought about by the improper investment12 and have his compensation reduced13 and to remove him if the beneficial interest
will be best served by so doing.14
II.

APPORTIONMENT OF THE SALE PROCEEDS OF
UNPRODUCTIVE PROPERTY

Another remedy, and one which has given the courts much
difficulty, is apportionment. When apportionment is granted, a
life cestui of a trust which has retained unproductive property
obtains a portion of the proceeds if this property is eventually
sold,1 5 thus reimbursing him for the loss of income during the
holding period.16
4 Patterson v. Vivian, 63 Misc. 389, 117 N.Y.S. 504 (1909), mod. on other grounds 137
App. Div. 596, 122 N.Y.S. 347 (1910) (where the court refused to permit an apportionment
of the sale proceeds of property which was acquired from the testator in its unproductive
state).
5 Will of Des Forges, 243 Wis. 178, 9 N.W. (2d) 609 (194:3); Thusrs REsrATEMENT SECOND
§231, comment c (1959).
6 This assumes that the trustee did not breach his duty by improperly delaying the sale.
7 TRUSI'S REsrATEMENT SECOND §209 (1959); Moore, "A Rationalization of Trust Surcharge Cases," 96 UNlV. PA. L. REv. 647 (194:8).
s As a rule, neither the highest legal rate of interest nor compound interest is assessed
against the trustee. See First and American Nat. Bank of Duluth v. Andrews, 219 Minn. 325,
17 N.W. (2d) 656 at 664: (194:5). See, generally, 2 Scorr, Thusrs, 2d ed., 207 (1956); Wright,
"The Measure of the Trustee's Liability for Improper Investments," 80 UNIV. PA. L. REv.
1105 (1932).
9 E.g., where the breach was willful.
10 Riggs v. Loweree, 189 Md. 437, 56 A. (2d) 152 (1947).
11 Willis v. Holcomb, 83 Ohio St. 254, 94: N.E. 486 (1911).
12 See 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., § §209, 213.3 (1956).
13 See 4 BOGERT, ThuSTS §979 (194:8).
14 See 4 BOGERT, ThuSTS §861 (1948). See 98 A.L.R. 1132 (1935).
15 See 3 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §241.6 (1956) for instances involving a sale of the un-
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Common Law

Once it has been determined that the testator intended (or
would have intended had he considered the matter) an apportionment, there would seem to be two theoretical bases upon which it
may be granted. First, it may be argued that since the word "income" is far from clear, we must look to the intention of the
testator to interpret this word and to determine whether the
testator intended the word "income" to include a part of the sale
proceeds of unproductive property. This result seems quite reasonable when the unproductive property was deliberately retained
in order to obtain a better price, and when the property is in fact
sold for more than could have been obtained when the duty to
sell first arose. If income is that which is derived from capital (or
labor, as the case may be) and if the only thing derived or intended
to be derived from holding this capital was the increment in value,
it would seem that this increment in value might properly be
termed income. Another possible theoretical basis for apportionment is that this constitutes a proper deviation from the express
terms of a trust, since it is necessary in order to carry out the purpose of the trust.17 This is done whenever the court orders a
cy pres administration of a trust.18
In attempting to ascertain the probable intention of the testator, the courts consider a number of factors. One of the most
important indicia of this intent is the respective relationships of the
life tenant and remainderman to the testator. It is more likely
that an intention by the testator to have an apportionment of the
sale proceeds will be found to exist if the income cestui was the
productive property after the termination of the life tenant's interest. See Uniform Principal and Income Act, §11, which states: "Where .•. the trustee is under a duty to change
the form of the investment as soon as it may be done without sacrifice of value and such
change is delayed, but is made before the principal is finally distributed, then the tenant,
or in case of his death his personal representative, shall be entitled to share in the net
proceeds received from the property as delayed income to the extent hereinafter stated."
Emphasis added.
16 See cases collected in 103 A.L.R. 1271 (1936); 115 A.L.R. 881 (1938); 116 A.L.R. 1354
(1938); 129 A.L.R. 1314 (1940); 142 A.L.R. 264 (1943).
17 See Walker v. Thomas, (D.C. Cir. 1935) 75 F. (2d) 667 at 669, indicating that the
court would reject the literal meaning of words in a trust instrument in order to carry
out the testator's intention. See also Thurlow v. Berry, 249 Ala. 597, 32 S. (2d) 526 (1947),
and Estate of Loring, 29 Cal. (2d) 423, 175 P. (2d) 524 (1946) to the effect that the doctrine of equitable deviation is applicable to private as well as charitable trusts. But see
note, 30 MINN. L. REv. 553 (1946) stating that deviation will not often be permitted when
the interest of another beneficiary will thereby be invaded without his consent.
18 4 Scorr, TRusrs, 2d ed., §399.3 (1956).
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principal object of the testator's bounty,19 and especially if this
beneficiary was dependent upon the testator.20
The courts also consider the amount of unproductive property
as compared to the size of the trust estate, so as to deny apportionment when the unproductive asset is small in comparison
to the entire estate. Thus, in Creed v. Connelly,21 where the unproductive property constituted approximately one seventh of the
total value, the court denied apportionment. A similar result
was reached in In re Marshall's Estate,22 where such property comprised less than one twentieth of the total. Moreover, the courts
may consider, in addition to the relative amounts of productive
and unproductive property, other equitable factors such as the
adequacy of the remaining trust income to support the life cestui.23
Still another factor which is often considered in determining
whether to grant apportionment is whether the asset was received
in its unproductive condition from the testator,24 and if so,
whether there was a mandatory direction to sell it.25 Ordinarily,
if the testator leaves unproductive property to the trustee, it is
believed that since he knew it to be unproductive, he would not
have intended the life tenant to receive an income until it could
be sold at a reasonable price.26 However, if the testator ordered
that the property be sold and the proceeds invested, no such inference as to his intent will arise. 27 Mr. Shattuck severely criticizes
this result, stating that there are many reasons for inserting or
19 In re Rowland's Estate, 273 N.Y. 100, 6 N.E. (2d) 393 (1937); Quinn v. First Nat.
Bank, 168 Tenn. 30, 73 S.W. (2d) 692 (1934); Furniss v. Cruikshank, 230 N.Y. 495, 130 N.E.
625 (1921); Lawrence v. Littlefield, 215 N.Y. 561, 109 N.E. 611 (1915). See also comment,
40 YALE L.J. 275 (1930).
20 Matter of Jackson, 258 N.Y. 281, 179 N.E. 496 (1932). See also Jordan v. Jordan, 192
Mass. 337, 78 N.E. 459 (1906) which distinguished Edwards v. Edwards, 183 Mass. 581, 67
N .E. 658 (1903) on the basis of the beneficiary's need for funds.
21272 Mass. 241, 172 N .E. 106 (1930).
22 43 Misc. 238, 88 N.Y.S. 550 (1904). But see Skilton, "The Rights of Successive Beneficiaries in Unproductive Trust Assets Not Bearing Interest," 15 TEMPLE L.Q. 241 at 259
(1941).
23 Lang v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 359 Mo. 688, 223 S.W. (2d) 404 (1949).
24 See Patterson v. Vivian, 63 Misc. 389, 117 N.Y.S. 504 (1909), mod. on other grounds
137 App. Div. 596, 122 N.Y.S. 347 (1910).
25 Even though the property was received from the testator in its unproductive state,
if there was a mandatory direction to sell, there is a strong likelihood that apportionment
will be granted. Edwards v. Edwards, 183 Mass. 581, 67 N.E. 658 (1903). However, apportionment was denied in an instance where there was not even an express power of sale.
Creed v. Connelly, 272 Mass. 241, 172 N.E. 106 (1930).
26 See Creed v. Connelly, 272 Mass. 241, 172 N.E. 106 (1930). But see In re Rowland's
Estate, 273 N.Y. 100, 6 N.E. (2d) 393 (1937).
27 See Edwards v. Edwards, 183 Mass. 581, 67 N.E. 658 (1903).
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omitting a mandatory direction to sell other than those concerned
with the computation of income.28
A few cases29 and the Uniform Principal and Income Act30
have granted apportionment only to the extent that the ultimate
sale price of the unproductive property exceeded the cost or inventory value of such property, thus preserving the corpus of the
trust intact. However, it would appear that most cases reject
this distinction.31
Lastly, courts may arrive at different results in cases involving
different types of property.32 For example, where the asset sold
was an interest-bearing obligation and where there was interest
in arrears, courts quite properly tend to grant apportionment. 33
Indeed, dividing the sale proceeds of an interest-bearing note with
interest in arrears is not truly an apportionment of corpus to the
extent that the income cestui's right to interest was also "exchanged" for the property acquired in settlement of the debt.
However, decisions denying apportionment of the sale proceeds
of stock,34 and other personalty, 35 under circumstances which may
well have allowed an apportionment of the sale proceeds of realty,
seem unjustifiable.
In conjunction with the remedy of apportionment, the common law also permitted the income beneficiary to shift the expenses of the unproductive asset to corpus. The ability of the life
tenant to so charge corpus with the burden of maintaining unproductive property is usually determined by the same criteria
that govern the availability of apportionment upon the ultimate
sale of the property.36 If expenses have been paid from income,
28 Shattuck, "Unproductive Trust Property in Massachusetts," 20 BoST. UNIV. L. REv.
447 at 452 (1940).
20 See, e.g., Willis v. Holcomb, 83 Ohio St. 254, 94 N.E. 486 (1911).
30 Uniform Principal and Income Act, §II, 9B Uniform Laws Annotated 365 (1957).
31 See Jordan v. Jordan, 192 Mass. 337, 78 N.E. 459 (1906).
32 See In re Clarke's Estate, 166 Misc. 807, 3 N.Y.S. (2d) 60 (1938), granting apportionment of the sale proceeds of personalty. Other courts have denied apportionment of personalty. See, generally, 3 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §241.1 (1956).
33 Compare In re Lander's Estate, 162 Misc. 201, 294 N.Y.S. 58 (1937), which denied
apportionment of the sale proceeds of preferred stock, to the cases cited in 103 A.L.R. 1271
at 1286 (1936).
34 See Shattuck, "Unproductive Trust Property in Massachusetts," 20 BoST. UNIV. L.
REv. 447 (1940).
35 In re Searle, [1900] 2 Ch. 829, distinguishing realty and personalty. Cf. In re
Lander's Estate, 162 Misc. 201, 294 N.Y.S. 58 (1937).
36 See 103 A.L.R. 1271 at 1273 (1936); 167 A.L.R. 1431 (1947). But see Hite v. Hite,
93 Ky. 257, 20 S.W. 778 (1892) following a more liberal rule for reallocation of expenses
than for apportionment.

1054

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 58

and if apportionment is later granted, the prevailing view is that
expenses are to be repaid to income from the gross sale proceeds,
and then the balance-the net proceeds-are apportioned.37
B.

Restatement of Trusts

The Restatement of Trusts dispenses with these tests of intention and states that in the absence of a contrary direction in the
trust instrument, there shall be an apportionment whenever an
asset produces substantially less than the current rate of income
on trust investments.38 However, even courts purporting to follow this position will deny apportionment if the equities sufficiently favor the remainderman.39 Such deviations from the Restatement position are not surprising, since the Restatement extended the application of apportionment considerably beyond
what appears to be the position of the case law. Nevertheless, if
a court desires to obtain one of the primary advantages of the
Restatement position - the avoidance of the case-to-case determination of the testator's intention -it would seem wise to limit such
deviation to the unusual case so that litigation will seldom appear
profitable to the remainderman.
The Restatement permits the shifting to corpus of expenses
on unproductive property whenever apportionment would be
available. 40 Section 241, after providing that the net proceeds of
the sale shall be apportioned in the absence of a contrary direction
in the trust instrument, states:
"The net proceeds are determined by adding to the net
sale price the net income received, or deducting therefrom
the net loss incurred, in carrying the property prior to the
sale."
Comment d to this section provides:
". . . if carrying charges have been paid out of income,
the amount so paid will be added to the amount which the
life beneficiary would otherwise receive on the sale."
37 See TRUSTS REsrATEMENT SECOND §241, comment l (1959); 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS §827,
notes 82, 83 (1948).
as TRUSTS REsrATEMENT SECOND §241 (1959). This section also requires apportionment
if the trustee delays selling "wasting" property or property producing an income substantially more than the current rate of return on trust investments.
39 Lang v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 359 Mo. 688, 223 S.W. 404 (1949).
40 TRUSTS REsrATEMENT SECOND §241 (1959) provides that there shall be an apportionment in the absence of a contrary direction by the trustee.
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Uniform Principal and Income Act

Section 11 of the Uniform Principal and Income Act also
makes provision for apportionment without looking to the unexpressed intention of the testator in each instance. Apportionment is proper under this act whenever the net income from an
asset falls below a mechanically determined level.41 However,
unlike the Restatement and the common law, the uniform act
provides that " ... in no event shall such income [i.e., the income
to be created by an apportionment] be more than the amount by
which the net proceeds exceed the fair inventory value of the
property or in default thereof its market value at the time the
principal was established or its cost where purchased later." This
is a very significant restriction. It permits apportionment only in
the case where unproductive property is eventually sold at a profit.
It offers no assistance to the life beneficiary in the frequent case
where the unproductive investment causes a loss both to income
and to corpus. This does not seem to be an apportionment of
corpus, but merely an allocation of capital gains to income in an
instance where there is little or no ordinary income.
The Uniform Principal and Income Act also permits a shifting of expenses from income to corpus, but the result reached
under this act is not always identical with that attained by the
application of the common-law. rule. This act provides that expenses on the unproductive property shall be charged to principal,
but that they shall be deducted from the gross proceeds of the
property when sold, the balance-the net proceeds-being apportioned. However, because of the provision in this act which limits
the apportionment to the amount by which the net proceeds exceed
cost or inventory value of the property, a frequent result of reimbursing the life tenant for these expenses will be to reduce by an
equal amount42 the apportionment to be given him when the property is sold.43
41 Uniform Principal and
42 Under the uniform act

Income Act §11 (1957), and see note 3 supra.
the benefits of the provision shifting the expense of holding
unproductive property to corpus are frequently illusory. This can be demonstrated by the
following hypothetical. A trust for successive beneficiaries has sold for $100,000 a parcel
of unproductive property which cost $80,000. This property had been retained in its
unproductive state for five years during which time expenses were paid from income in
the amount of $10,000.
If the uniform act did not shift expenses to corpus, then the life tenant would receive
no reimbursement for his previous outlay of $10,000 expenses, but he would receive an
apportionment of $20,000 computed as follows:
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APPORTIONMENT WHERE THE Loss

wAS

CAUSED

BY THE TRUSTEE'S BREACH OF DUTY

Where the unproductive property is retained without fault by
the trustee, a refusal to grant apportionment would deprive the
life cestui of both the income from the unproductive asset and
also of other trust income to the extent that it is needed to pay
the cost of maintaining that property. This sacrifice would be
forced upon the life beneficiary in order to prevent an immediate
sale for less than what is considered as the real value of the property. Since the retention is largely for the benefit of corpus, it is
reasonable to suppose that the testator would have wanted a portion of the sale proceeds to be awarded to income as reparation
for the loss sustained during the unproductive holding period.
But compare the above situation to an instance where the trustee
negligently delayed the sale of an unproductive asset. In the
$100,000
-------SB0,000 award to corpus, and the balance of the $100,000 or $20,000
l+ (.05 X 5 yrs.)
to income. The limitation (that the amount given to income shall not be greater than
the amount by which the net proceeds of sale exceed the cost of the property) will not
reduce the $20,000 award, since that award is not greater than the $100,000 sale proceeds less the $80,000 cost.
Under the uniform act in its present form the net benefit to the life tenant would be no
greater. The net proceeds will be $90,000 ($100,000-$10,000 expenses), and the life tenant
will be reimbursed for the $10,000 of expenses which he incurred. The apportionment
will then grant $10,000 of the remaining $90,000 to income, computed as follows:
$90,000
-------$72,000 to corpus and $18,000 to income, except that the limitation
l+ (.05 X 5 yrs.)
states that the apportionment shall not be more than the amount by which the net
proceeds ($90,000) exceed the cost of the property ($80,000), thereby reducing the
award to $10,000.
Thus under the uniform act, despite its shifting expenses to corpus, the life tenant
receives $10,000 of expenses and $10,000 of apportionment. In the absence of the shifting
of expenses he received a $20,000 apportionment. The result is the same. Only where
the property is sold for an amount sufficiently large to avoid the limitation will there be
any benefit from the provision shifting expenses to corpus. Thus if the cost of the property in the above hypothetical were $70,000 instead of $80,000, then the life tenant would
have received the $10,000 expenses and $18,000 of income, for the limitation would have
been ineffective to reduce the life tenant's portion. Or if the cost had been $75,000, the
limitation would not have completely eliminated the effect of shifting the expenses to
corpus. The life tenant would have received the $10,000 expenses plus $15,000 apportionment ($18,000 but limited to $15,000 which is the amount by which the $90,000 net proceeds exceed the cost of $75,000).
43 The uniform act not only causes the life cestui to pay the carrying charges if there
are proceeds available from the apportionment; it also requires that interest be paid on
the amount of these charges from the fund created by the apportionment. Charging the
life beneficiary with interest is improper, since the remainderman would not have received
the interest on the fund had it not been used to pay carrying charges. See Brandis, "Trust
Administration: Apportionment of Proceeds of Sale of Unproductive Land and of Expenses," 9 N.C.L. REv. 127 at 137 (1930).

1960]

COMMENTS

1057

former situation the life tenant was compelled to sacrifice income
for the intended benefit of corpus. In the latter case because the
loss was caused by the breach of the trustee, it is probable that the
life cestui could have compelled a sale of the improper asset.44 The
former situation is similar to a loan, where the life cestui was
ordered to forego income temporarily in hope of avoiding a sacrifice sale of a trust asset; when the asset is later sold, he is repaid
for his loss through apportionment. It would seem that the life
tenant's equities vis-a-vis those of the remainderman are much
weaker in the latter situation where the loss was caused by a
negligent fiduciary. Indeed, it is often arguable that the life
tenant should be estopped to claim an apportionment where the
trustee was negligent, and the life tenant fails to call the matter
to the attention of the remainderman by requesting that the
charges be placed on corpus, or by instituting an action to compel
a sale of the asset. This will be discussed in more detail later in
the comment.45
The testator's probable intention in instances where a trustee's
breach causes a loss of income or corpus furnishes little aid, for
there is no compelling reason to believe that the grantor would
have wanted this loss to be recouped by the life tenant against
corpus rather than by proceeding against the fiduciary to whose
judgment the testator entrusted his property.46 Where the trustee
is not negligent, apportionment is the only available remedy, and
the intent of the grantor that this remedy should exist can be
more readily assumed.
However, neither the Restatement nor the few cases on point
have refused apportionment because of trustee negligence. Section 241 of the Restatement of Trusts, Second, comment a, provides that there shall be apportionment irrespective of negligence
by the trustee in acquiring or retaining the unproductive property. The uniform act is not entirely clear on this point.47
44 Willis v. Holcomb, 83 Ohio St. 254, 94 N.E. 486 (1911). However, if before the
life tenant has a reasonable opportunity to compel a sale, a sale becomes impractical, the
equities would be more evenly balanced between life tenant and remainderman.
41S See text accompanying footnotes 62-65.
46 In re Bothwell's Estate, 65 Cal. App. 598, 151 P. (2d) 298 (1944) contains dicta to
the effect that apportionment must be used if available. No other case indicating this has
been found.
47 Section 11 of the Uniform Principal and Income Act provides for apportionment
when " ..• the trustee is under a duty to change the form of the investment as soon as
it may be done without sacrifice of value and such change is delayed. . . ." (Emphasis
added.) Does this contemplate a situation when the trustee breached his duty by originally acquiring the asset? Or where the trustee is under a duty to sell immediately?
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Of the few American cases48 on point, the earliest is Parsons v.
Winslow,4 9 where the trustee improperly invested the trust corpus,
losing not only the income, but also the greater part of the capital
as well. The trustee was surcharged but his personal estate was
insufficient to absorb the entire loss. The court ordered an apportionment of the recovery. This court showed no indication
that it considered that the existence of negligence on the part of
the trustee in any manner affected its determination to grant apportionment. Nor did the court show any indication that it would
treat a claim for apportionment of the corpus itself any differently
from a claim for an apportionment of the recovery from the
trustee. 50
The question arose more recently in Tennessee when a trustee
bank which had misinvested trust funds became insolvent. 51 The
bank was surcharged but the satisfaction was less than complete,
and the issue presented was how the loss should be borne between
the life tenant and remainderman. The court held that both the
recovery from the trustee and the sale proceeds of the unproductive
property should be apportioned between the two classes of beneficiaries, 52 but there was no discussion of the effect, if any, of the
trustee's breach on the grant of apportionment.
An unusual approach was taken by the California Court of
Appeals53 in a case where the loss was caused by the improper
48 There are also a few English cases on point. In re Grabowski's Settlement, L.R. 6
Eq. 12 (1868) involved a life tenant's request for apportionment of the recovery from a
trustee whose negligence caused loss to both income and corpus. The trustee's assets
were insufficient to satisfy the claims of both beneficiaries, and the court awarded the
entire amount to corpus. Since the award was granted for loss to income as well as to
corpus, it would seem that the life tenant should have had an interest in the recovery
irrespective of apportionment. Another case, In re Bird, [1901] I Ch. 916, involved a
request for apportionment of the sale proceeds of the unproductive property (here also
there was a loss both to income and corpus) and the court took note of the existence of a
breach of trust, but permitted apportionment. However, there was no negligent delay by
the life tenant in not compelling a sale, as neither beneficiary was aware of the existence
of the improper investment.
49 16 Mass. 361 (1820).
50 The opinion did not state whether the apportionment only involved the recovery
from the trustee, or whether the amount salvaged from that improper investment was also
being apportioned. In the former instance, the apportionment is not very significant since
it seems that the recovery represented both income and corpus, and thus both cestui
should have had an interest in the recovery irrespective of apportionment.
51 Cate v. Hamilton Nat. Bank, 178 Tenn. 249, 156 S.W. (2d) 812 (1941); Quinn
v. First Nat. Bank, 168 Tenn. 30, 70 S.W. (2d) 692 (1934).
52 See the argument of counsel in In re Grabowski's Settlement, L.R. 6 Eq. 12 (1868),
contending that a distinction should be recognized between an apportionment of the
recovery from the trustee and an apportionment of the sale proceeds of the unproductive
property.
53 In re Bothwell's Estate, 65 Cal. App. (2d) 598, 151 P. (2d) 298 (1944).
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holding of unproductive property. The court not only held that
there could be an apportionment, but said in dicta that where
apportionment was available the life tenant could not proceed
against the trustee.54 This dicta seems clearly unreasonable.
There is no reason to immunize the trustee from suit by the life
tenant or remainderman because apportionment was available to
shift the incidence of the loss between the two classes of
beneficiaries.
There are other instances where the question of apportionment arose 55 or was mentioned in dicta56 when the trustee had been
guilty of a breach of duty which caused the loss. However, none
of these cases discussed the effect, if any, of the trustee's negligence
upon their determination to grant or refuse apportionment. Nor
did the cases distinguish between a grant of apportionment of the
sale proceeds of the unproductive property, and a division of the
recovery against the trustee in which both beneficiaries were
interested.
Let us now turn to look at the net effect of the rule permitting
apportionment where the loss was caused by the trustee's breach.
First, if trustee negligence can be proved and if the trustee is
financially responsible, then the grant of apportionment will be
of no significance since both parties will be made whole at the
expense of the trustee57 and the cost of suit, if not recovered from
the trustee, will probably be apportioned between the two classes
of cestui in proportion to their respective interests in the recovery. 58
54 Id.

at 604-605.
v. Commissioner, (1st Cir. 1941) ll8 F. (2d) 644 at 648.
56 Matter of Jackson, 258 N.Y. 281 at 290, 179 N.E. 496 (1932).
57 This assumes negligence can be proved. The risk of failure to prove trustee negligence will normally fall most heavily upon the remainderman. If the proceeds of sale are
substantial and if the property has not been unproductive for more than a few years, the
life tenant can recover most of his lost income via apportionment. If the jurisdiction
grants apportionment irrespective of trustee neglect, then the remainderman will have to
prove the trustee's breach in order to recoup from the trustee the loss caused to corpus by
the apportionment. On the other hand, if apportionment is denied in instances where
the trustee is negligent, the remainderman will still have the burden of proving the trustee's
breach in defending against the apportionment claim by the life tenant. (If the burden
of proving the trustee's freedom from negligence were placed upon the life tenant, he
might well be in the position of being unable to prove negligence so as to obtain damages
from the trustee, and unable to prove an absence of negligence so as to obtain an apportionment.) Only when apportionment would provide substantially less than the amount
of the lost income would the life tenant have any real interest in proving the breach of
duty by the trustee.
58 If the trustee is found negligent, he may be surcharged for the amount of the
objector's attorney fees. See Perry v. Perry, 343 Ill. App. 644, 99 N.E. (2d) 715 (1951);
note, 16 GA. B.J. 93 (1953). But see Hardy v. Hardy, 217 Ark. 305, 230 S.W. (2d) ll
(1950). If the attorney fees are not charged to the trustee they may well be charged ratably
55 Plunkett
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If, on the other hand, the trustee is totally without funds, then
the effect of apportionment is the same as where there is no
negligence at all-it shifts the incidence of the loss from income to
corpus to the extent of the award. If apportionment were denied
in such a case because of trustee neglect, then the loss would remain
upon income. Denying apportionment seems entirely warranted
where the life tenant had knowledge of the breach and ample opportunity to compel a sale of the property, and where he inexcusably delayed in so doing. This is especially true if the life
tenant did not request that carrying charges be placed upon
corpus thereby alerting the remainderman to the unproductivity
of the asset. Without such notice, the remainderman may not be
in a position to know that the asset is unproductive.
The third possibility is that the trustee has some funds, but
not in sufficient amounts to make good the loss caused by his
breach. If there was only a loss of income while the corpus of the
trust remained intact, then to the extent that the apportionment
exceeds the amount recovered from the trustee, the loss is shiftedto corpus. When there has been a loss to both income and corpus
as a result of this trustee's negligence, the problem is more complex.
Let us assume a $1,000,000 trust res which has been reduced to
$500,000 by the loss on an improper investment. In addition to
the loss of corpus, there was also a $100,000 loss of income (five
percent on one million dollars for two years) during the period
the asset was retained. Of the $600,000 loss, assume $300,000 was
recovered from the trustee. If apportionment is granted, the
$300,000 recovery will be added to the $500,000 remaining from
the investment, and the two apportioned together. Assuming a
five percent yield on trust investments, the apportionment would,
under the Restatement59 formula, be made as follows:

$500,000.00 Salvaged investment
300,000.00 Recovery from trustee
$800,000.00 Total
$800,000.00
New corpus= 1 + (.0 5 X 2 yrs.) = $727,272
Income= 800,000.00-727,273 = $72,727.00
to the various cestuis in accordance with their respective interests. See In re Rosenbaum's
Estate, 115 N.Y.S. (2d) 450 (1948). See especially the comprehensive annotation .in 9
A.L.R. (2d) 1132 (1950).
59 TRUSTS RF-STATEMENT

SECOND §241 (1959).

1960]
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Assuming that apportionment is denied, however, the life tenant
should still share in the $300,000 recovery from the trustee which
was partially in return for lost income. If a successor trustee
brings suit, or if the two beneficiaries join and sue, the recovery
should seemingly be apportioned according to their respective
losses. This would give to income 1/6 of the recovery ($100,000
lost income as to $600,000 loss in toto) or $50,000 as compared to
$72,727 when apportionment is permitted. Although some courts
have awarded the entire recovery to corpus,60 this seems improper
and may encourage a separate action by the life tenant61 to recover
lost income where this is permitted.
IV.

SUBROGATION AND EsTOPPEL

One difficulty in applying apportionment arises when a life
tenant, barred by laches62 or estoppel63 from commencing suit
against the trustee, requests an apportionment of the same proceeds
of the unproductive property. If the life tenant is not barred from
seeking apportionment64 should the remainderman be permitted
to recoup the loss from the trustee, or only be subrogated to those
rights which the life cestui possessed (which would be nil if action
by the cestui has become barred by !aches or estoppel)? To permit
such an action by the remainderman allows the life tenant to ac60 In re Grabowski's Settlement, L.R. 6 Eq. 12 (1868).
61 Plunkett v. Lampert, 231 Minn. 484, 43 N.W. (2d) 489

(1950). See also Talbutt v.
Security Trust Co., (E.D. Ky. 1938) 22 F. Supp. 241 and cases cited in 136 A.L.R. 693
(1942). These cases indicate that the life tenant may commence a separate action for lost
income caused by the trustee's negligence. Even if the life tenant and remainderman join
in an action against the trustee, it would seem that the court may grant separate damages
for the injury to each interest and thus have a race of diligence determining which award
will be satisfied.
62 Will of North, 235 Wis. 639, 294 N.W. 15 (1940). See 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed.,
§219 (1956).
63 See 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §177 (1956). But for the difficulty in successfully basing
a defense on estoppel, see Liberty Title and Trust Co. v. Plews, 6 N.J. 28, 77 A. (2d) 219
(1950). Cf. Estate of O'Donnell, 8 Ill. App. (2d) 348, 132 N.E. (2d) 74 (1956). See also
language in In re Bothwell's Estate, 65 Cal. App. (2d) 598 at 609-610, 151 P. (2d) 298 (1944).
64 See In re Bothwell's Estate, 65 Cal. App. (2d) 598, 151 P. (2d) 298 (1944);
Delaware Trust Co. v. Bradford, 30 Del. Ch. 277, 59 A. (2d) 212 (1948). But see
Spring v. Hollander, 261 Mass. 373, 158 N.E. 791 (1927); and the language in Green v.
Crapo, 181 Mass. 55, 62 N.E. 956 (1902), indicating that the consent of a life tenant who
individually held the unproductive property as a tenant in common with the trustee would
bar her action against the trustee for negligence. A strong argument in favor of estopping
the life tenant from obtaining apportionment is the unfairness of permitting him to
remain silent while the property is retained and while the remainderman may be totally
unaware that that property in question is unproductive, and then to claim a portion of
the corpus. If the life tenant's failure to complain earlier was in any way responsible for
the loss, it would seem only fair to prevent the life tenant from shifting this loss to the
innocent remainderman.
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complish by indirection much the same recovery which he was
barred from obtaining directly,65 although the amount of the
recovery via apportionment might be smaller. On the other hand,
it seems unjust to deny this remedy to the remainderman who
may have had no earlier opportunity to compel a sale. These
difficulties can be avoided and a more just result reached by
estopping the life tenant from claiming apportionment under
circumstances which would preclude his recovery against the
trustee.

Conclusion
Although it is occasionally necessary to deny apportionment on
equitable grounds, the application of this remedy usually produces
a fair and desirable result. A rule which requires an apportionment without a determination of the testator's unexpressed intention avoids much costly litigation. Also, a trustee who knows that
apportionment will ultimately be granted is able to determine
whether to retain unproductive property without unduly favoring
either class of beneficiary. Finally, when the retention is ordered
to preserve the trust res for the benefit of all the cestui, apportionment distributes the burden of holding this property in a manner
which seems equitable and in accord with the intention of the
testator in most instances. It is therefore not surprising that,
absent a contrary provision in the trust instrument, both the courts
and state legislatures are tending toward the consistent application of the apportionment remedy.
Bruce M. Stiglitz, S. Ed.
65 Nevertheless, the reasoning of cases allowing suit by the remainderman in the
absence of apportionment would appear equally applicable where there had been an
apportionment. See cases cited in 7 AL.R. 1021 (1920), allowing recovery by the re•
mainderman despite his acquiescence during the life of the life tenant, since the remainderman had then no right to enforce his claim to the fund.

